Squaring the circle

I've been mulling over one paragraph of a post by George Conger, first published in the Church of England Newspaper of June 17.  It comments on the ACNS press release after the last meeting of the Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion which I noted here earlier.

The must-have button for General Convention 

You can set aside the headline 'England allowed to discuss Anglican Covenant': it says nothing and is wholly unrelated to the text. It probably merely indicates the prejudices of some headline writer.

Conger says,

Under the terms of the Anglican Covenant, provinces that do not ratify the agreement would not be able to participate in decision-making about the covenant. While the Church of England cannot reconsider the covenant until 2015, the Standing Committee carved out an exception to this rule to allow the Archbishop of Canterbury and Mrs. Paver, the Church of England’s lay representative to the ACC to remain part of the process – though not as a representatives of the Church of England.

The rule referred to is:

(4.2.8) Participation in the decision making of the Standing Committee or of the Instruments of Communion in respect to section 4.2 shall be limited to those members of the Instruments of Communion who are representatives of those churches who have adopted the Covenant, or who are still in the process of adoption. (The Anglican Covenant)

First, English representatives would currently have no problem with this clause because they may be regarded as 'still in the process of adoption'. So too will every Province which does not actually reject the Covenant (which is the Philippines and Scotland to date - and that's assuming they've informed the ACO officially).


Second, the SCAC determined that those who are members of the committee ex-officio are not present as representatives. Unfortunately for them this merely confirms that they cannot, under the rule, participate 'in the decision making ... in respect to section 4.2' [of the Covenant]. Bishop James Tengatenga, as chair of the ACC, and Mrs. Paver, as vice-chair, cannot participate in discussion of Covenant issues precisely because they are not 'representatives'. 

This might also pose a question for those Primates who are members of the SCAC. Para. 6 of the Schedule to the Constitution (pdf) of the Anglican Consultative Council, and §8.5, describes them as Ex-officio members of the ACC, their membership lasting only so long as they are members of the Standing Committee. While they self-evidently represent their respective Churches they are not members of the Standing Committee in a representative capacity.

The Archbishop of Canterbury is an Instrument of Communion in his own right and can presumably participate in that capacity, but not, by section 4.2.8, as a member of the SCAC. Presumably also Bishop James Tengatenga and Mrs. Paver can be involved in such Covenant decisions only when the matters are under consideration by the Anglican Consultative Council itself because there they are representatives. 

And, I would suppose, their absence from decision making will have to be explicitly recorded and the records subject to disclosure should any disgrumtled Church consider legal action.

Third, and almost incidentally really, the Covenant does not give the Standing Committee power to have 'carved out an exception to this rule', or any other. 

However,
Fourth, critically, I suggest that this section of the Covenant will, if put into practice, lead to actions which are not in accord with English charity law.


Members of the SCAC are trustees of the ACC. The Charity Commissioners' Essential Trustee (a summary, not the law itself) says:

(D) Trustees and their responsibilities
Charity trustees are the people who serve on the governing body of a charity. They may be known as trustees, directors, board members, governors or committee members. The principles and main duties are the same in all cases.

(1) Trustees have and must accept ultimate responsibility for directing the affairs of a charity, and ensuring that it is solvent, well-run, and delivering the charitable outcomes for the benefit of the public for which it has been set up. 

... 

(E7) Trustees can generally delegate certain powers to agents or employees, but will and must always retain the ultimate responsibility for running the charity. (Emphases added.)

The Constitution of the charity (the Anglican Consultative Council) is the primary document for the charity and trustees must conform to it: neither the Covenant nor the trustees themselves can override it. 

The Constitution, as usual, grants the Standing Committee the power to order its own procedures, the Archbishop of Canterbury having a veto) (§27.1:2). It is this power, I suspect, which enabled the Standing Committee to try to sort out the mess this bit of the Covenant is already starting to create.


The Constitution, so far as I could see, makes no provision to exclude trustees from decision making except where there is a conflict of interest or loyalty (§10)). The Charity Commissioners say,

Trustees appointed by another organisation, such as by a local authority, (sometimes referred to as nominative or representative trustees) have exactly the same duties and responsibilities as other trustees. They must act independently of the organisation which appointed them and act only in the best interests of the charity. There may well be occasions where such trustees will have to act in a way which conflicts with the interests of the organisation appointing them. In such circumstances the best interests of the charity must come first; this duty overrides all other considerations. (A guide to conflicts of interest for charity trustees.) 

As I understand it, trustees may not recuse themselves from whole areas of the charity's decision making by policy. Covenant or no Covenant. There is no such power in the Constitution and to do so would be to cease to exercise their trusteeship.


I suggest that section 4.2.8 of the Covenant, if implemented, would almost inevitably be in conflict with English charity law and the application of it would certainly give lawyers grounds for an action against the  SCAC if a Church felt it had been unfairly penalised or disadvantaged.


Therefore something must give. It will be the Covenant.

=========
Disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer, canonical nor secular. But I do work for a charity and need at least a rudimentary grasp of the principles. However, if you can point me to any misrepresentation or case law or anything authoritative at variance with my argument I will make whatever changes are necessary to this post and apologise at the earliest opportunity.


And, if you can do that, you might also be able to answer another, related, question. What's the legal standing of 'alternate' trustees? I can't see a reference in the Constitution to this practice of naming deputies, and I can't see how they can be trustees unless they're full members. The Charity Commission doesn't list them as trustees. I suppose they could merely have observer status. Either way, I think this is an example of the SCAC being too casual about trusteeship - and, as always, opaque.  

Something strange in the woodshed

The picture is intriguingly entitled
Anglican_Communion_corrected. By whom?

Some funny things are going on in relation to the Covenant.  I guess they reflect divided attitudes amongst those who might regard themselves as 'players' in this particular game.

1) The Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion
The first was the announcement by the SCAC that there was now "no timeframe" for the adoption of the Covenant:

The Standing Committee received an update on the progress of the Anglican Communion Covenant. It was noted that eight Provinces had endorsed the Covenant to date, in some cases with a degree of qualification. They were the only responses received so far by the Secretary General. The committee also noted that the President, Chair, and Vice-Chair all hold their offices other than as representatives of their Provinces. 

There was general agreement that no timeframe should yet be introduced for the process of adoption of the Covenant by Provinces. The Standing Committee will return to this question following ACC-15. Press Release

While it was entirely understandable that the Church of England should not yet have informed the  Secretary General of the result of its deliberations on the issue, has not the Province of the Philippines told him that they have rejected the Covenant, or did he just forget to mention it?

"No timeframe" and "following ACC-15" keep options open. Drexel Gomez' drumbeat of 'urgent, urgent' has clearly been ignored. Instead an open-ended process would allow the Anglican Consultative Council to kill the Covenant if enough members wished to do so. Alternatively it would allow one province after another to sign up till those who had initially declined to do so became overwhelmed by its popularity and conceded.

Conditional trusteeship of the Anglican Communion?

The reference to the standing of ex-officio members of the Standing Committee strongly suggests a worried conversation on the lines of 'what is the role of members of the Standing Committee who represent provinces which have not signed the covenant?' (Which could easily be 5 out of 11 elected members.)


My understanding of English charity law (which governs the Committee) is that it is pretty straightforward: as trustees they must all act in the best interests of the charity and not of any nominating or electing body; they cannot be excluded from decision making (except in cases of conflict of interest) nor delegate their responsibilities to others. Some could, of course, voluntarily step back from certain questions or decisions. 


But this would result in the farcical position of overlapping layers of decision making within the governing body of the Communion. Once again, the Covenant would be a source of visible disunity in the Anglican Church.


2) GS1878: report by the Business Committee on the reference [of the Covenant] to the dioceses


GS1878 is a masterclass in hints and insinuation in an objective report. Having noted the defeat of the Covenant under the rules, it says,

6) ... For the record, there is nothing in the Synod’s Constitution or Standing Orders that would preclude the process being started over again, whether in the lifetime of this Synod or subsequently, by another draft Instrument to the same effect being brought forward for consideration by the General Synod before being referred to the dioceses under Article 8. The Business Committee is not, however, aware of a proposal to re-start the process in this way.

General Synod in session

Now why would you comment on a matter which has not been proposed? 


I don't doubt the first sentence is factually correct but I wonder whether this paragraph was included in any earlier report on a defeated Article 8 business. It sounds like a snub to those who confidently stated that that the matter cannot be brought back to Synod before 2015. But even if this is not absolutely and constitutionally correct it is certainly politically impossible to bring the issue back in this Synod: so to whom is this hint directed?


More worrying is the extended discussion on the votes. While, again, I'm sure it's accurate in every detail it is completely irrelevant. Its sole purpose seems to be to obfuscate the result and imply that the vote is in some way unreliable. 


Whether by intent or not, the discussion is undermining of synodical government. In the 18 years' debate which led to the creation of General Synod the repeated refrain was: 'the Church is not a democracy'. Voting by houses and dioceses was an expression of the synodical character of the government of the Church of England. It deliberately avoided making individuals the constituent element of church government (as, for instance, did the refusal to give all lay members a vote for their representatives in General Synod).


Thus the CofE's governance does not ask, are a majority of members or their representatives content with a proposal, it asks: are a majority of local synods content? And they were not.


Yet now we are told that if a few individuals here or there changed their mind or their diocese the result could have been quite different (paras. 8&9). Correct, I'm sure, but so what? Members voted the way they voted, synods divided accordingly and the motion was lost. 


The only 'so what?' I can think of which might justify the Business Committee endorsing such a report is that they were thoroughly brassed off with the result. If this isn't an abuse of process it is certainly playing fast and loose with the interpretation of the result.

Who is the Anglican Communion Office working for?

It seems that the Evangelism and Church Growth Initiative of the Anglican Communion had a good meeting in Kuala Lumpur earlier this month - ACNS press release.

Evangelism and Church Growth Initiative Group - ACNS

But Mark Harris has been asking: who is the North American representative,  Rev Dr Julian Linnell of the  Anglican Frontier Mission.

Turns out he's not from the Episcopal Church at all but from the schismatic Anglican Church of North America (ACNA) and also a priest in the Province of the Southern Cone.

So what is the Anglican Communion Office playing at?

Was this an embarrassing error, and they really thought he did belong to TEC? Seems unlikely given the care they usually take with appointments.

I suppose it is possible that the invitation went to the Anglican Frontier Mission and Dr Linnell was their choice. But all the same you'd have thought they'd check out his acceptability with TEC first.  Maybe they did, and this man was the person in the whole of the US for the job, and available for the meeting. In which case, fair enough.

Are they deliberately courting ACNA? After all ACNA has always seen itself as the province-in-waiting against the day that TEC is thrown out of the Communion under the Covenant mechanisms.

Or is this the straw in the wind which shows that the Anglican Communion Office has already discarded TEC altogether?


And, either way, have they forgotten who pays a large percentage of their bills?

I wonder whether the Standing Committee are also a scrutiny committee and, if so, where we can get a complaint form from and ask for an investigation?

Why worry?

The Covenant is, as I've said before, part of a twin strategy to change the Communion for ever.  Most recently the focus has been on the Covenant for two reasons: it's now out for adoption by Provinces, and because it is a document in the public domain.

Covenanters: Bishop Gregory Cameron and
Archbishop Drexel Gomez in 2009

The second (chronologically the first) part of the strategy has had much less attention.  This is the creation of the Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion (SCAC). This is because change has been done in long slow steps, many of the changes have been buried in official documents, it has been seen as a matter in internal concern, and because documentation has been less easy to find.  And it's dull.  A Covenant has a symbolic resonance in the Church; constitutional change has not.

The Constitution of the Anglican Communion is now on the ACC page of the Anglican Communion website.  A Q&A style presentation of the Standing Committee is here.

The changes in the constitution of the Communion would give effect to the proposals contained in the Covenant; the Covenant would would give significant powers to the Standing Committee of the Communion (and here).  It would, in effect, make the SCAC a new Instrument of Communion in its own right.

The result of the changes that have already taken place and those which the Covenant may instigate would change the nature of Anglicanism for ever.

The consequences will, over time, stretch right to the heart of each church.  It may be that this will be a good thing (though I don't see it myself) but surely it can't be good to do this by default, without informed consent, without some sharing and general acceptance of a vision for the future.

First, it will turn the Communion into a Church, instead of a family of Churches (irrespective of who's in and who's out).

Local synods will grow less independent, autonomy will be constrained, episcopal authority will be circumscribed.  I don't think this will happen all at once; I think it will happen step-by-step, issue-by-issue and probably with no-one outside the Anglican Communion Office taking stock as it goes on.

From here to eternity, via the SCAC

Second, it will stretch the distance between pew and centre still further.  There's already a long distance between pew and General Synod, let alone pew to Archbishop.

To turn this round: ordinary worshippers will feel even further from the places decisions are made.

Third, the manner in which these changes have already been effected will predispose the manner of future decisions.

In particular the bureaucratic-political nature of the Church will be reinforced with the great majority of people effectively excluded by an glass wall from decision making.  The international elite of fixers and global leaders will talk to one another and operate in ways that most others (including all but the best funded and staffed lobby groups) will not be able to follow, let alone influence.

What is already an overwhelmingly clerical church will become even more so.

Fourth, the voluntary nature of adherence and expression of faith will shrink still further.  In 1828 the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in England effectively made membership voluntary.  That fact has never been part of the church's self-image.  Instead, monarchical (strictly princely) attitudes have characterised the exercise of episcopal authority, mirrored by excessive deference.  In England at least lay members of the Anglican Church are subjects, not citizens.

Fifth, there will be an impact at the local, parochial and deanery level.  Curiously the tendency to ignore or circumvent the rules, and for self-confident clergy to do their own thing, may grow stronger. (This capacity is an internalisaton of monarchical attitudes turned back against the official monarch).

The future of the Anglican Church?

For most people, most of the time, I guess the greater likelihood will be that initiative is further stifled, passivity, dependence and deference will continue to be the order of the day, and the effective engagement of the laity in making decisions that will realise the potential of the people of God will continue to be minimised.

Sixth, there will be a little less money in the local church and an even higher ratio of (relatively better paid) senior clergy and bureaucrats to regular worshippers.

*   *   *

Sometimes I wonder why I worry.  I was once ordained and now I am without episcopal permission to officiate (no-one's refused - I just haven't asked).  This leaves me (and other retired / resigned clergy in this position) unable to be members of the Church.  There is simply no space for us in the constitution.

But I do worry.  The shape, flavour, rhetoric, financing, decision-making, trust, suspicion, competence, clarity, history, vision, style, values, ethos of any organisation predispose how it functions on the ground.  All of these elements are predominantly set by the top. The words and actions of the few senior leaders are setting the church on a particular spiritual path to the future.

I have not seen or heard anything in the debate around the Covenant any official consideration of its impact in the pew.  It's all about inter-Provincial relationships, as though they were separable from the people who constitute the membership, the foundations, the purpose of the Church.  And who are the source of its funding. Could we not seek to shape the Church as though it served the spiritual needs and potential of the people of God?

Covenant between God and the people of Papua New Guinea, signed by the Prime Minister, 2007

Another fine mess

The Rt. Rev. Hector "Tito" Zavala of Chile,
now Primate of the Province of the Southern Cone

Bishop Hector 'Tito' Zavala has been elected Primate of the Province of the Southern Cone, succeeding Bishop Greg Venables.

However (see Mark Harris here and my earlier post) Bishop Zavala has recently been demoted from member to consultant of the Inter-Anglican Standing Commission on Unity, Faith and Order.

Thus we now have a Primate of the Anglican Communion who is not allowed to be a member of a significant commission of the Anglican Communion.

A couple of questions
This raises a constitutional question or two.  The Commission is not only concerned with ecumenical matters but also with internal questions of unity, faith and order.  The fourth point of its mandate gives it the brief:

to review developments in the areas of faith, order or unity in the Anglican Communion and among ecumenical partners, and to give advice to the Churches of the Anglican Communion or to the Instruments of Communion upon them, with the intention to promote common understanding, consistency, and convergence both in Anglican Communion affairs, and in ecumenical engagement. (emphasis added)

Thus Bishop Zavala may only be consulted on the central spiritual sinews of the communion at the level of the Commission, but, as a full member of the Primates' Meeting, may contribute fully to discussions and decisions on the same matters.  How is a member of the senior body to be demoted from a junior body?  Presumably a Primate would expect to be consulted (or, at the least, have the right to be consulted) on the membership, agenda, priorities and output of a Commission - or, since I can't tell much from the website, does the Standing Committee control all these aspects as it controls the budget?

It also raises questions about the role of bishop and primate in the Anglican Communion.  To what extent can a bishop be a focal point of unity, the face of ecumenism, the fount and judge of order within the church if he himself suffers under a disability (in the legal sense)?  And if the primate is the episcopal focus of that Church is the whole Church equally disabled?

Making martyrs
Perhaps, who knows, Kearon's treatment of the Bishop only enhanced his standing amongst the provincial electorate.  For the most part punitive action in political disputation (as opposed to criminality) frequently has the effect of enhancing the standing of the person being punished.  You make martyrs, increase the moral stature of the person punished, and raise the stakes of the dispute all round.  Finding a way out becomes significantly harder.

But these negative mechanisms are the ones that the leaders of the Communion want to endorse in the Covenant.  In the name of  unified communion there is symmetrical amputation: if TEC consecrate a bishop who has a partner of the same sex a leg will be lopped off; if the Southern Cone go shopping for parishes in TEC's jurisdiction then lop off an arm.  There may be no moral equivalence for the breach of a moratorium but there's an equally negative response anyway.

And the way out?
Assuming he wants to get out of this hole, of course, Kearon now has to find a way of saving face which will enable him to say that he acted properly against Bishop Zavala and which lets the Bishop back into full standing in the Communion.

The easiest way is in the hands of Bishop Zavala himself.  He could simply write a letter to Kearon, answering his questions suitably vaguely and blame 'administrative misunderstandings' for the absence of an earlier letter.  Kearon could then accept his response and take no further action.

But why would the bishop do that?  His election is a direct accusation against Kearon and the Archbishop together. By doing nothing and taking his place amongst the councils of the primates he puts them on the back foot: they will have to justify their actions and they will have to deal with the anomalies they have created.

We wait to see what will happen.  In the mean time, in the words of Ollie Hardy, 'Well, that's another nice mess you've gotten me into!'

The architect's manifesto

Leonardo Ricardo at Eruptions at the Foot of the Volcano has done us all a favour by bringing together many of the words of Archbishop Drexel Gomez, retired, chief architect of the Anglican Covenant.

Archbishop Drexel Gomez

 In 2001 Drexel Gomez co-edited with Maurice Sinclair (wikipedia) a short book called To Mend the Net: Anglican Faith and Order for Renewed Mission. It was published by The Ekklesia Society.

Please note the date: 2001.  Two years before Gene Robinson (wikipedia) was consecrated Bishop of New Hampshire.

To Mend the Net is a collection of essays with a conservative prescription for the reform of the Anglican Communion.   It is not available on the net.

(References below are to paragraph numbers)

The editors' focus was on The Episcopal Church's disregard of the Lambeth 1.10 resolution on sexuality, TEC's decision to monitor progress towards women's ordination in all dioceses, and the equal valuing of marriage and non-marital sexual relations within the Church (1.8) though the valuation of homosexuality within the church was their particular horror (1.6).

Amongst other things the book prescribes:

• 'Enhanced Responsibility' for the Primates' Meeting (as commended by Lambeth 1998, Resolution III.6).  This was central to the book's programme. (1.2)
• The 'need to be clear what kind of new practices can be accepted into a process of open reception, how necessary openness can be guaranteed, and how a proper collegiality among Anglican bishops can be restored when it is eroded or broken' (1.8)
• 'Some may be tempted to imagine that democratic structures linked with democratic values will sole our problems.  Instead ...' [we choose] 'truth and holiness of life' 'We want to allow the authoritative Scriptures to speak into and redeem our Church and our world and we refuse to relativise or domesticate the Word of God.'  (1.10) (See an earlier post, A Richer Covenant)
• They claimed no brief to put a legislative structure above Provinces, but espoused 'the exercise of a form of political authority at the international level.' (1.11)
• 'Genuine collegiality will normally require a minority to respect decisions supported by a majority of Primates.'  Experiment in 'doctrine, discipline or ethics' would need 'a consensus or a very substantial majority of Primates' (2.2)

The Exercise of Enhanced Responsibility was summarised as:

• Self Examination led by Primates' personal example (3.1)
• Education: promoted by Primates who should also 'specify the limits of diversity and the frame of reference of provincial autonomy.' (3.2)
• Advanced Sharing: especially sharing initiatives with one another in advance of implementation (3.3)
• Preparation of Guidelines: if a significant minority of Primates disagree with the proposed initiative it should not proceed.  If such advice is ignored then 'guidelines' should 'address the situation created and identify its remedy.' (3.4)
• Godly Admonition: the 'guidelines' would be sent to the errant province or diocese [to address the issue of 'local' action allowed but not authorized by a Province] for approval and acceptance. 'This step would be taken with a very positive intent.' (3.5)
• Observer status: if the admonition was not heeded the Archbishop of Canterbury would demote the recalcitrant body from member to observer on international Anglican bodies. (3.6)
• Continuing Evangelization: the Archbishop of Canterbury would also be asked to authorize 'appropriate means of evangelization, pastoral care and episcopal oversight' of the offending body. (3.7)
• New Jurisdiction: And if resistance continued the Archbishop of Canterbury would be advised how to set up a new jurisdiction to replace the offending body as the legitimate Anglican entity in that geographical area. (3.8)  The 'intransigent body' would be suspended. (3.8)
• Primates' Commission: a standing commission to assist the Archbishop of Canterbury would be established 'to the furtherance of priorities in mission and the re-ordering in cases of disorder.'  (3.9)

What remains in the Covenant?

Drexel Gomez was not chosen to chair the Covenant Design Group as a neutral chair.  His views of the present and future of the Communion were well known and the Archbishop of Canterbury must have chosen him with this in mind.

Most obviously the proposal to place the Primates' Meeting at the heart of the response to conflict has vanished.  Instead the Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion has been given the equivalent responsibility.  This must be a bitter blow to Archbishop Gomez who regarded the Anglican Communion office and its officers as little more than the agents of the compromised, wealthy western church.  The Primates' Commission has died too.

The Covenant is, however, a mechanism to specify the limits of diversity and it intends to be the frame of reference of provincial autonomy.  Its proposal for an officer in every Province is explicitly to ensure advance sharing of possible areas of conflict.  Similarly the preparation of 'guidelines' (a strange term for the task) and admonition have been refined and are built into the Covenant mechanisms. So too is the possibility demoting offending Provinces within the international organs of the Communion.

The Covenant does not purport to intervene below the level of the Province - but it is a very live question.  Kenneth Kearon raised it in relation to possible action against the Anglican Church of Canada, citing the Windsor Continuation Group Report para 48.  Canadians (and others) raise it against the Church of England.  Consider the Diocese of Sydney.

The formal authorization of intrusion by one Province into another's jurisdiction (Continuing Evangelization) and the creation of new, replacement, jurisdictions are more worrying.  So far as I know these are not on the agenda.

But what would happen if the the Covenant is signed and TEC and Canada are expelled?  I'll bet somebody's been thinking it through, and I'll bet these options are still on the table.

Utterly negative

Mark Harris, amongst others, comments on the self-authorised action of the Secretary General of the Anglican Communion in demoting Bishop Tito Zavala of the Southern Cone from his place on the Inter Anglican Standing Commission on Unity Faith and Order (IASCUFO).


He comments, in particular, of the weasel words 'gracious restraint' and the use of 'request' to mean command.  When those with power use language in this way something more than ordinary Anglican circumlocution is going on.  It is the use of language to attempt to shape reality, to create a obfuscatory cloud which gloves force in sweeter terms, and it pervades the thinking which informs the Covenant.


But there is another important point.  Bishop Tito Zavala is not (nominally, in any case) being demoted because of the intrusion of the Southern Cone into the jurisdiction of its northern neighbours.  He is being demoted because the Secretary General has not had an answer to his letter.  In other words the punishment for a substantive offence (e.g. consecrating a partnered lesbian) is identical to procedural offences.

What this reveals is the poverty of the Secretary General's toolbox.  All he can do is to demote or sack.  He has no mechanism for constructive engagement, nor for graduated punitive responses. All he can do is to threaten and, if the Province fails to be impressed, he excludes.  There is nothing here for building up the Communion.

Thus the Covenant. The one element of constructive engagement is the requirement to seek agreement (twice - 3.2.4, 4.2.4), which is all very well but things have presumably only got into the hands of the Standing Committee because the parties can't agree.  After that the only options are exclusion or steps on the way to exclusion.  Utterly negative.

High time we started a different discussion: how can we build a truly international, diverse, cantankerous and holy communion in which its differences are strengths, not occasions for pushing people out of the boat.  See previous post.

The exercise of power

Design Indaba, Capetown

I am pleased to see the new openness - see Day 1 and following - of the SCAC. It must have felt like this while looking through a peep-hole at the priest celebrating mass in mediaeval churches.

It is clear that power in the Anglican Communion is now located in the Standing Committee - but it is not so clear that power is being exercised there.

Given that the account of the SCAC meeting was designed to obscure as much as it revealed there is little evident between the lines. Watch out for Jan Butter, the new Director of Communications. His skill in obfuscation is highly honed and he can expect a job anywhere in the Anglican Church - and a good few other organizations as well.

But it is possible to read some things between the lines. This can only be speculative - though what else is the blogosphere for - but it seems to me that (1) there is insufficient clarity about the purpose and function of the committee, (2) there is confusion between representation and executive functions, and (3) much power is exercised elsewhere.

A mini ACC?

The ACC was intended and is constructed as a consultative body (hence its name), not as a parliament. Its Standing Committee looks and feels like the ACC in minature rather than a body whose members were chosen because of their executive capabilities.

For example, much like an ACC meeting, a large amount of time was given to presentations of work done by various ministries and networks. It wasn't clear whether this was because the presentations raised particular policy questions or required key decisions. Maybe they did and it just wasn't reported. But if not, what were the presentations for? This is not a new group of people and members can surely be kept informed of what's happening by email / paper. There may well be reasons for calling officers in to address issues face-to-face. But a programme of presentations per se is a distraction technique. It keeps people informed of action based on decisions taken previously and elsewhere.

There was also no sense that this aggregation of agencies were working to, or could be measured against, a single plan. How is the SCAC supposed to be an executive without a clear framework to measure both progress and direction of travel?

Exercising power in the SCAC

The key question is: at what level of significance are members of the SCAC required to assent to (and thus have the power to veto) policy decisions in relation to the Communion's ministries, networks and other initiatives? Do they have to positively assent to new groups, or can they stop those once created? If they don't make decisions beforehand they do not exercise power.

The most obvious point which showed the SCAC's lack of power, and also their annoyance with that fact, was the exclusion of TEC from some of the Anglican agencies:

Recent developments in the Communion

There was an opportunity for members of the Committee to express their views and ask questions about the decision to remove or alter the status of members from one province serving on the Anglican Communion’s ecumenical dialogues and IASCUFO. The Archbishop of Canterbury and Secretary General Kenneth Kearon explained the rationale behind this decision. In particular the Committee was assured that the Archbishop had not acted unilaterally but with the support of the Secretary General of the Anglican Communion; that they had acted within their powers; and that the action had not been punitive in intention. Rather it had been taken—following the breaking of the agreed moratoria—in response to the needs of the Communion in respect to ecumenical dialogues and faith and order bodies. Committee members were told that other Provinces were under consideration. (Day 1)

The Committee are told in terms that they may express views and ask questions. Great, so can I, even if I can't ask questions in person. And I would not be reassured by the assertion that the decision had not been taken unilaterally but by two people. President and Chief Executive acting together can hardly be construed as action by two people who come to the same conclusion by independent routes. The Committee are effectively being told, in the last line, to keep off the grass - they will be informed but neither consulted nor given a veto.

And just what are powers by which the President and Chief Executive acted - what is their source, where are they set out, how far do they extend, how may the exercise of those powers be scrutinised, evaluated?

(Presumably the statement of an absence of a punitive intention is intended to convey both that the action was nicer than had its motivation been otherwise, and that the perception of being punished is of no concern to those who took the decision.)

The most explicit attempt to exercise power was the attempt by Dato Stephen Isaacs to exclude TEC from the ACC by, in effect, a private member's motion (Day 2 and Day 4). (Mark Harris exploded, accusing the SCAC of 'usurping powers not its own' here.)

On Day 2 the proposal was defeated, on Day 4 it was revisited. Phillip Aspinall asserted that the SCAC did not have the power to make such a decision (though this did not, apparently, stop them voting on it).

It was also stated that the Standing Committee did not have all the powers of the ACC, especially when it came to the Membership Schedule.

Nonetheless the ACC membership was in fact the most noticeable omission for the agenda. Resolution 14.37 of the last ACC asked the Standing Committee to consider the entry of the Spanish Episcopal Church and the Lusitanian Church (which, incidentally, opposes the Covenant), and to review relationships with all extra-Provincial jurisdictions with the ACC (ACNA?). This has the potential to significantly reshape the ACC. You would have thought that there would have been a passing reference - or perhaps there was, but it was just omitted from the public record.

The SCAC may not have the power to decide membership but it clearly has the power to do everything up to the point of decision.

If the SCAC remains a mini-ACC, more deliberative than decisive, then it will not exercise the powers nominally located with it. Executive power still has to be exercised - and on present evidence it looks as though it will be exercised by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Secretary General in concert.

Legitimacy

Perhaps the most significant discussion (on Day 2) was sparked by Kenneth Kearon's report.

He concluded by noting that the credibility of the Primates' Meeting and the ACC was being openly questioned by some and this criticism was increasingly focused on the Standing Committee itself.

'By some?' By ex-members of the SCAC itself, perhaps; by leaders of the Global South, by Archbishop Orombi here? I doubt that the blogosphere alone would be sufficient to perturb the Committee (it certainly shouldn't).

'Credibility' is an interesting term - presumably not in the sense that the SCAC can't be believed but in the sense that its survivability is in question. I would think 'legitimacy' was a more accurate word.

The recorded responses to the questioning of their credibility were revealing. First, from the ACC Chair James Tengatenga: reaffirm the representative and elected nature of the ACC. Second, from the ACC Vice-Chair Elizabeth Paver: renew trust in the ACC through greater openness and better communications. Both miss the point. It is entirely possible to be a representative body and lose legitimacy. Better PR is important but legitimacy depends on substance, not presentation.

One key aspect of legitimacy in a representative body is the continuing relationship between those elected and their constituency. Presumably the constituency of ACC members is their electorate - the governing bodies of each province (I'm guessing). However the new constitution has been brought in over several years by private conversations between ACC representatives and (to judge by the CofE's actions and the secrecy which surrounded it) a very few of the most senior leaders and advisers in each province. There is a proper place for confidentiality in any organization. But on a matter as basic as the rules by which the organization works such secrecy seems wholly inappropriate. It has broken or evaded the presumed relationship between elector and elected. No wonder questions of credibility and legitimacy are raised.

Second, we do not live in harmonious times. And, in all probability, never will. In such a setting official communications quite properly seek to be a studiously neutral in respect of the contentious issues and contending parties. The consequence is that official publicity is always, necessarily, bland and neutered. It cannot address exactly those issues that its audience wants addressing because those issues are the substance of the dispute.

Credibility and legitimacy will only be restored by both building a relationship between ACC members and their sponsoring provinces in a way which is much more extensive than it is at present (at least in the CofE). Each delegate should be explaining and selling both the Communion and the participation of all Orders in its governance. There should be an active education programme reaching into the parishes. Official publicity can never restore faith in a body once undermined.

But the fact is that some people will only trust the ACC if it abjures homosexuality and damns those who refuse. Others will only trust the ACC if it accepts homosexuals as full people before God. But a representative body (in full or in miniature) merely brings together in one room such incompatible views. Therefore it is highly unlikely it can ever be an effective executive.

The next big change

Archbishop Rowan Williams questioned whether the ACC's committee structure was appropriate for this new century. He said questions needed asking about whether revised Instrument structures were required to better foster the relationship-building parts of the Communion's life, "so when it comes to looking at the complex questions of the Communion we have a better foundation upon which to build."

Later in the meeting, the Committee asked a small group of Standing Committee members to prepare a proposal for ACC-15 on undertaking a strategic review and planning process relating to ACC membership and meetings and Standing Committee structure and operation.

Now this is going to be fun. On past evidence most of the discussion will happen underwater - invisible to all but the most practiced Anglican divers. ACC 15 will see an outline and a limited version may be made public, but no-one in the swim will want the whole matter debated in public.

Perhaps this is a real power of the SCAC. Not the executive power which Williams, Kearon and the ACO seem determined to retain, but considerable influence on shaping the questions and the course of debate.

There is just one hint of hope, however, expressed as 'continuing indaba'. If this is to be the future of the Communion - carry on talking - and structures are reshaped to support and foster continued conversation then there may be hope for good things from and for the Communion.

What are the odds?

Confidential memo leaked

Look-out Peak, facing north

The Anglican Province of the Antarctic

The only Anglican Church which circles the world

From the Office of the Primate

~ Confidential - for internal use only - not for publication ~

The Anglican Province of the Antarctic strongly supports the proposal to have eight representatives of the Primates Meeting on the Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion.

• This will give Primates their proper weight in the councils of the Communion (almost half the votes).
• As voting for Primates' representation is by region this will mean each primatial member is chosen by 4 or 5 people (if equally distributed). If we can persuade Australia into the south-east Asia group then it should be a simple matter to ensure Antarctic membership on the SCAC.
• Any group of trustees requires the strength and resilience given by the appropriate skill-set of its membership. It is therefore appropriate and important for the governance of the Communion to ensure that the sagacity, stability, experience, piety, learning and vision of the Primates should predominate. It will also help to have the ability to deliver provincial assent to decisions. As the proverb says, the leaders of the most important ships should be able to see from the highest icebergs.

membership of the SCAC will also enable the Province of the Antarctic to play its proper role in the leadership of the Communion. Once on the SCAC (and assuming membership rises to 19) it will only be necessary to convince 9 other people to back our campaign to declare the Church of England incompatible with the Communion.

(I'm assuming a simple majority is all that is required. If, as seems possible, what is really required is to persuade Kenneth Kearon, then our task may be more difficult.)

Notes:

1) To date it would seem as though the SCAC may act as though the Covenant is already in place and, on the other hand, could act in ways which ignored the Covenant once it was in place. As realpolitik is much more important that formal agreements the Province of the Antarctic should be as close as possible to the actual locations of power.

2) It is unfortunate that the Primates have already lost two-fifths of their representation on the SCAC. We are not a group of people inclined to walk off the stage for trivial reasons. However eight primatial members will enable us to absorb such resignations more easily giving the body greater organizational resilience.

3) The suggestion, in some quarters, that this will give me a summer and winter holiday in the north, travel costs paid, is cynical and strongly deprecated.

4) Similarly, the view that this is a second best solution, compensation for those who lost the battle for the Primates' Meeting to govern the working of the Covenant , is a canard that should be squashed immediately.

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A personal note: I apologise for the lack of memos recently caused by the prevailing weather and consequent white-outs. It is not easy to see when future breaks in the weather will occur but, after all, it is mid-winter.

Constitutional mayhem

One route through the constitutional hurdles

1) The actions of the Archbishop

If the Archbishop of Canterbury, merely by virtue of his office, has the effective power to instruct the Anglican Communion Office to sanction the US Episcopal Church (TEC) and threaten the Churches of Canada and the Southern Cone - then what's the point or power of the Standing Committee of the Anglican Covenant (SCAC)?

If the SCAC can be instructed, even by their Chair, are they not failing in their duty as trustees of the Communion?

What is the constitutional position of the Anglican Communion Office (ACO)? Is it entirely the arm of the SCAC or does it have powers in its own right or does the Archbishop of Canterbury command it, or parts of it?

2) TEC, ACC and the Covenant

The Covenant will create a new basis of Anglican fellowship - i.e. the community of those who sign. How will this group relate formally to the legally constituted ACC?

If TEC fail to sign the Covenant they cannot thereby, so far as I can see, be expelled from the Anglican Consultative Council (ACC) - unless the new (still secret) constitution makes it possible, which I doubt because of the time it's taken to create and agree the new constitution.

The supposition is that the Covenant group will call the shots of inclusion / exclusion. But by what mechanism? The SCAC is allocated certain roles in relation to the Covenant but the Covenanters (apologies, Scotland) are not given a voice or forum merely by virtue of their signatures. The ACC, which may contain non-signatories, remains the only formal assembly.

3) Accountability

The ACC elect most of the members of the SCAC either directly or by election of officers of the ACC who are thereby ex officio members of the SCAC. Can they also call the SCAC to account by virtue of the threat to vote them out? Is (as I suspect) the SCAC already effectively independent of the ACC, a position reinforced by the adoption of the Covenant?

The Archbishop of Canterbury is inherently unaccountable. Is it right that one unaccountable individual should be able to command some or all of the other Instruments of Communion?

4) The Primates’ Meeting

The Primates' Meeting has, I suspect, been effectively neutered in the allocation of the Communion's power, except insofar as it elects one third of the SCAC. It has been the focal point for a great deal of conservative rhetoric and frustration. A kettle with a tiny spout is liable to explode when it boils.

Anyway, anyone might be led to draw the conclusion that constitutional niceties are irrelevant and only actual power counts.

Covenanters praying in the countryside, watched by the Archbishop's horsemen?

Questions on the critical clause

The critical clause (4.2.7) in the Covenant in relation to the new powers it creates reads (my numbering):

1) On the basis of the advice received, the Standing Committee shall make recommendations as to relational consequences which flow from an action incompatible with the Covenant.

2) These recommendations may be addressed to the Churches of the Anglican Communion or to the Instruments of the Communion and address the extent to which the decision of any covenanting Church impairs or limits the communion between that Church and the other Churches of the Communion, and the practical consequences of such impairment or limitation.

3) Each Church or each Instrument shall determine whether or not to accept such recommendations.

(1) Advice is received from the Primates' Meeting and the ACC. It can only be a advice: the autonomy of the Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion (SCAC) means that it cannot be instructed. If it were instructed, and acted in accordance with those instructions without debate, it would be liable to legal challenge on Trust and Company law.

The Commentary on Revisions to Section 4, issued with the final version of the Covenant, was at pains to stress the autonomy of member Churches and also that:

What is made explicit in the current draft is that the Standing Committee derives its authority from its responsibility to the two Instruments of Communion which elect its membership, and on whose behalf it acts. It provides a co-ordinating function for matters to do with Covenant maintenance, supported by relevant expertise (cf 4.2.2) and in close communication with both the Anglican Consultative Council and the Primates’ Meeting, on whose advice it acts. (cf 4.2.6 and 4.2.7)

This is accurate historically and structurally but not legally. The SCAC acts on behalf of the Primates' Meeting and ACC but only in the sense that the SCAC must determine for itself what is in the best interests of the Communion in accordance with the charity's stated objects (see below, The centralised state of Anglicanism).

No amount of gloss will hide the fact that it is the trustees of the Communion (the SCAC) in whom full legal powers are vested and who may not legally delegate their decision making to others, not even to those who elected them. The politics may make it difficult for the SCAC to avoid the advice of its electorate but the law says it must be wholly responsible for its decisions.

We are punching in the dark to some extent here given that the revised constitution and the new Memorandum and Articles of the SCAC have not been made public (see below). We do not know how the formal relationship between SCAC and the ACC is described, nor whether or to what extent the Primates' Meeting is formally recognised within the new constitution. None of this ignorance changes the position of the trustees.

(2) Why 'or' in the phrase: "... recommendations may be addressed to the Churches of the Anglican Communion or to the Instruments of the Communion ..."? This would seem to preclude recommendations made to both. So, presumably, if the recommendation to the Churches is to turn their back of the malefactory member the SCAC cannot at the same time ask the Instruments of Communion to withdraw their co-operation. And vice-versa.

And, while we're at tiny detail, why 'the' in: 'Instruments of the Communion'? This would seem to imply that the ACC and the Primates' Meeting are the tools of the SCAC as the legal entity of the Communion. (It could just be a typo, of course, as elsewhere in the Covenant the phrase is 'Instruments of Communion'. But you can't afford typos in a foundation document, nor in a document liable to close legal scrutiny.)

The model of conflict on which the Covenant is based is here at its sharpest. The origin is surely a simplified narrative of the present dispute in which TEC is the baddie and everyone else is appalled.

The focus is on:

the decision of any covenanting Church [which] impairs or limits the communion between that Church and the other Churches of the Communion

But we are talking about relationships here - and relationships are not one-sided. The extent of impairment or limitation of a relationship lies as much with the offended church as with the offender. Furthermore the presence of the Covenant mechanisms would seem to preclude the chance of continued amity in disagreement and encourage churches to take offence.

A much more serious weakness is that the whole mechanism appears to presume a model of one-way offence. One Church takes a decision that one or more others don't like. One Church is the offender and bears the moral obloquy; the innocent are hurt. But the much greater probability is of a number Churches taking differing stances over a particular issue, of some Churches being divided within themselves, and of highly complex conflicts without obvious angels and demons. Similarly steps are likely to be small and cumulative away from one another and any trigger-points artificially constructed.

In sum, the Covenant arrangements will magnify smaller disputes which participants could probably sort out for themselves, and be wholly inadequate to a complex, multi-directional conflict which divides the Communion. Power politics will not confine itself to rules that don't enable the powerful to achieve their objectives.

(3) And after all that it's apparently entirely up to each member Church or each Instrument of the Communion to make up their own minds what to do. (Except that it does not appear to have the option of remaining neutral or making no formal response: it 'shall determine whether or not to accept such recommendations.')

Either this makes the whole process vacuous or (more likely) each body will have decided what it will do long before the final determination; it might merely wait for organisational or pseudo-legal cover.

An organization in freefall

The SCAC has announced two new members:

• Bp Paul Sarker (Moderator of the Church of Bangladesh and Bishop of Dhaka)
• Revd Canon Janet Trisk of South Africa (Rector of the Parish of St David, Prestbury in Pietermaritzburg, in the Diocese of Natal)

It also happened to mention in passing "the resignations of Archbishops Justice Akrofi and Henry Orombi".

So, in the course of a year (so far) they have lost 4 of 15 members. And another member, Katharine Jefferts Schori, has been encouraged to resign. This is not good for any organization.

All 4 have been amongst the more conservative (though conservatives remain).

2 of the 4 resigned were elected by the Primates' Meeting. The 3 who remain are at the liberal end of the spectrum (Aspinall prefers 'moderate').

From so far down the mountain it is hard to see what is happening at the top - but the implication would seem to be that the conservatives have decided they will no longer participate at the highest level of the Anglican Communion. Can formal schism be far behind?

The current membership is:

• Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams (chair)
• Archbishop Philip Aspinall of Australia
• Presiding Bishop Katharine Jefferts Schori of the U.S.-based Episcopal Church
• Archbishop Barry Morgan of Wales
• Bishop Paul Sarker of Bangladesh
• Bishop James Tengatenga of Central Africa (ACC chair)
• Canon Elizabeth Paver of England (ACC vice chair)
• Bishop Ian Douglas of the U.S.-based Episcopal Church
• Anthony Fitchett of the Anglican Church in Aotearoa, New Zealand and Polynesia
• Dato Stanley Isaacs of the Province of South East Asia
• Philippa Amable of West Africa
• Bishop Kumara Illangasinghe of Ceylon
• The Rev. Canon Janet Trisk of South Africa

Why the Covenant won’t work.

The Covenant will work in all sorts of ways, of course, some intended some predictable if unintended.

What it won’t do and can’t do, is what it says on the tin. It cannot ‘prevent and manage’ disputes:

This Commission believes that the case for adoption of an Anglican Covenant is overwhelming:

• The Anglican Communion cannot again afford, in every sense, the crippling prospect of repeated worldwide inter-Anglican conflict such as that engendered by the current crisis. Given the imperfections of our communion and human nature, doubtless there will be more disagreements. It is our shared responsibility to have in place an agreed mechanism to enable and maintain life in communion, and to prevent and manage communion disputes. (Windsor Report §119)

The reason it cannot ‘prevent and manage’ disputes is simple. If the Covenant mechanisms can be applied retrospectively (which is effectively what is being attempted) then these mechanisms are applied as it were from the outside of the dispute. They step in like courts and police to adjudicate and enforce an outcome – in this case the expulsion (in whole or part) of the offending members of the Communion.

But once the Covenant is in place it can never act as if from the outside of the dispute. The next disputes, large and small, will be conducted by people who will be acutely conscious of the Covenant and its conflict resolution provisions. The Covenant will be inside the next dispute and party to it.

The Windsor Report sought to address a situation in which the storm blew across the whole Communion and no-one could catch it or control it. Logically, therefore, they proposed a mechanism which would catch and control the next one.

But, in creating the Covenant, they changed the weather-pattern of next dispute. The next storm will be funnelled very quickly into the narrower and narrower space of: mediation – Primates’ Meeting and ACC – Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion. There will be no point in disputants doing anything else. If the SCAC is the point where things are determined then there is every incentive to get the SCAC to decide the issue as soon as possible.

The very presence of the SCAC will be an invitation to belligerents not to accept local resolution but to magnify their case, to internationalise it, and to deliberately engage the SCAC as a means of self-promotion, win or lose. The very existence of a single, international, focal point will attract small storms and will encourage them to expand.

For example;

In 1913 in Kikuyu, a village in what is now Kenya, a conference took place between Anglican and Presbyterian missionaries to address the issue of how migrant Christians were to be welcomed in one another’s churches. They outlined the terms of co-operative work in the mission field and, buoyed up with shared enthusiasm, they concluded with a shared Holy Communion celebrated by the Bishop of Mombassa, W.G. Peel.

The neighbouring, High Church, unsubtle, passionate Bishop of Zanzibar, Frank Weston took deep exception. He had not been present and he did not realise that there had been no formal agreement at Kikuyu. Weston started a dispute over inter-communion, the recognition of non-episcopally ordained clergy, and the validity of their sacraments. Bigger things were at stake. Weston feared the spread of liberalism in the Church, the prospect of a pan-protestant alliance which would marginalise Catholics, and the impact on his missionary work where he competed with Islam and Roman Catholicism both of which evangelised with single, clear voices.

The disagreement rapidly expanded. The Archbishop of Canterbury set up a ‘conflict resolution mechanism’ (an international committee of bishops). The committee broadly supported Weston’s views though they did accept that, in some narrow circumstances, nonconformists could receive communion in Anglican churches. The dispute was conducted by post and pamphlet during the first world war: consider how it would be with today’s communications.

If the SCAC is successful in resolving a few minor ecclesiastical skirmishes its mechanisms will be hailed as proven and greater expectations will be laid on its shoulders. Small successes will set up bigger failures.

Disputes of the scale of the current dispute over sexuality are thankfully infrequent. But they are analogous to civil war, not to cases of marital disharmony. In a civil war, by definition, the mechanisms of law and order break down and ‘ordinary’ conflict resolution is replaced by force of arms.

The predictable result will be that, sooner or later, a storm will destroy the Covenant arrangements. When the storm is still at its most destructive it will be concentrated into a committee of 15 people, many of whom will be partisan and none of whom will be neutral. Sooner or later the depth and intractability of such disputes will destroy the SCAC and the Anglican Communion will have to start again looking for a new structure.

Instead of doing what it says on the tin the Covenant will have achieved its opposite.

* * * *

The leaders of the Anglican Communion are intelligent, reflective, careful people. It maybe that hope has clouded their vision as to this outcome of the Covenant arrangements or that, having once run their colours up this particular flagpole it would be too embarrassing to haul them down again. But I doubt it.

I suspect a more cynical consciousness. I suspect the purpose of the Covenant and its conflict resolution mechanisms was never to ‘prevent and manage’ future disputes.

I suspect the Covenant was intended merely to give effect to the terms on which the most vociferous conservatives were willing to remain within the Anglican Communion: the exclusion of TEC. It is a one-shot weapon. Any longer-term consequences are left to be dealt with when the time arises.